回复：关于比特币潜在弱点的专门讨论在哪里。
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这不一定非得是破坏兼容性的变更。新节点可以长期接受旧交易，等到大多数节点已经升级后，再开始拒绝不带工作量证明的交易。或者，它们也可以始终接受旧交易，但每个时间段只接受有限数量。
我多次考虑过在交易上使用工作量证明，但通常最后都会觉得，收取 0.01 的交易费本质上与之相似，而且更好。0.01 基本上就是一种工作量证明，只不过没有被浪费。但如果问题在于验证大量交易，那么检查工作量证明可能会更快。
一个涵盖面更广的部分解决方案，是实现这样一种想法：检测收到的区块数量是否出现不太可能的骤降。这样一来，攻击者仍然需要掌握网络中相当大一部分算力，才能从 DoS 攻击中获益。
引用 gavinandresen 于 2010 年 8 月 11 日 04:10:56 PM 的发言
比特币的 P2P 网络会遭受各种类型的拒绝服务攻击。
好了，我说出来了。
+1
此时进行任何演示性测试，都只会表明我们已经知道的事情，并把开发时间从加强系统转移到应付实际运行中的紧急状况上。
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It doesn't have to be such a breaking change. New nodes could accept old transactions for a long time until most nodes have already upgraded before starting to refuse transactions without PoW. Or, they could always accept old transactions, but only a limited number per time period.
I've thought about PoW on transactions many times, but usually I end up thinking a 0.01 transaction fee is essentially similar and better. 0.01 is basically a proof of work, but not wasted. But if the problem is validating loads of transactions, then PoW could be checked faster.
A more general umbrella partial solution would be to implement the idea where an unlikely dropoff in blocks received is detected. Then an attacker would still need a substantial portion of the network's power to benefit from a DoS attack.
Quote from: gavinandresen on August 11, 2010, 04:10:56 PM
Bitcoin's p2p network is subject to various kinds of denial of service attacks.
There, I said it.
+1
Any demonstration tests at this point would only show what we already know, and divert dev time from strengthening the system to operational fire fighting.